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The Issue Presented 
Domestic courts frequently apply foreign law. For example, the forum’s choice-of-law rules may 
require a court to apply foreign law, or a party may expressly base a claim or defense on foreign 
law. Private international law (or “conflict of laws”) provides principles governing many aspects 
of how courts should identify and interpret foreign law.1 
In the U.S. federal courts, the applicable rule is Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which provides, in relevant part: “In determining foreign law, the court may consider 
any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or 
admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court’s determination must be treated as a 
ruling on a question of law.”2 
However, those principles do not provide clear guidance on how heavily a court should weigh a 
foreign government’s own statements about the meaning of its law.3 This was the issue presented 
in Animal Science Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.4 
* Christopher A. Whytock is Professor of Law and Political Science at the UC Irvine School of Law. He is an 
associate reporter for the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws and a member of the 
U.S. State Department’s Advisory Committee on Private International Law. The author was one of the lead co-
authors of an amicus brief filed in the case. See Brief as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Animal Science 
Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., 138 S.Ct. 1865 (2018) (No. 16-1220), 2018 WL 1202845 
[hereinafter Brief]. This Introductory Note expresses the author’s personal views and should not be taken to 
represent the views of the American Law Institute. This is the Author’s Original Draft.
1 See generally PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS, SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES & CHRISTOPHER A. WHYTOCK, 
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 12.15-12.19, at 550-561 (6th ed. 2018); TREATMENT OF FOREIGN LAW: DYNAMICS TOWARDS 
CONVERGENCE? (Yuko Nishitani ed., 2017); Maarit Jäntera-Jareborg, Foreign Law in National Courts—A 
Comparative Perspective, 304 Recueil des cours 281 (2003).
2 F.R.C.P. 44.1. See generally Arthur R. Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the “Fact” Approach to Determining Foreign 
Law: Death Knell for a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 613 (1967).
3 See Animal Science Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd 138 S.Ct. 1865, 1873 (“Rule 44.1 
does not address the weight a federal court determining foreign law should give to the views presented by theforeign government….Nor does any other rule or statute.”). 
4 See id. at 1869 (2018) (“When foreign law is relevant to a case instituted in a federal court, and the foreign 
government whose law is in contention submits an official statement on the meaning and interpretation of its 
domestic law, may the federal court look beyond that official statement?”). For a prior discussion of this case, see 
Kristen E. Eichensehr, International Decision, 113 AM. J. INT’L. L. 116 (2019). 
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The Animal Science Litigation 
In Animal Science, petitioners alleged that respondents conspired to fix the price of vitamin C 
exports to the United States, in violation of U.S. antitrust law. Respondents raised various 
defenses based on the assertion that their price-fixing was required by Chinese law.5 In support 
of the respondents, the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China filed statements 
asserting that the alleged conspiracy was instead “a regulatory pricing regime mandated by the 
government of China.”6 The petitioners challenged this position, noting that the Ministry 
identified no written law expressly requiring respondents to fix vitamin C export prices, and that 
China had previously made a statement to the World Trade Organization (WTO) that it “gave up 
export administration of…vitamin C” in 2002.7 
In rejecting respondents’ argument and holding that Chinese law did not require them to fix 
prices, the District Court provided one possible answer to the question of foreign government 
statements regarding the meaning of foreign law: such statements are “entitled to substantial 
deference, but will not be taken as conclusive evidence….”8 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision, offering 
an alternative rule: “[W]hen a foreign government, acting through counsel or otherwise, directly 
participates in U.S. court proceedings by providing a sworn evidentiary proffer regarding the 
construction and effect of its laws and regulations, which is reasonable under the circumstances 
presented, a U.S. court is bound to defer to those statements.”9 
An amicus brief filed with the Supreme Court proposed a third approach: “U.S. courts should 
give respectful consideration to a foreign government’s statements about its law. But as a matter 
of law, a foreign government’s statements cannot be binding on U.S. courts. Instead, U.S. courts 
should accurately and independently determine the meaning of foreign law taking into account 
not only the foreign government’s own statements, but also other relevant information about that 
law.”10 
The Supreme Court’s Decision 
The Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit’s decision, unanimously holding that “[a] federal 
court should accord respectful consideration to a foreign government’s submission, but is not 
bound to accord conclusive effect to the foreign government’s statements.”11 
5 These included defenses based on the act of state doctrine, the foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine, and the 
principles of international comity. Id. at 1870. 
6 138 S.Ct. at 1870. 
7 Id. at 1871. 
8 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, 784 F.Supp.2d 546, 557 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (denying respondents’ motion to 
dismiss). The District Court later denied respondents’ motion for summary judgment, “declin[ing] to defer to the 
Chinese government’s statements to the court regarding Chinese law” and holding that “[t]he Chinese law relied 
upon by [respondents] did not compel their illegal conduct.” 810 F.Supp.2d 522, 525 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).  
9 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, 837 F.3d 175, 189 (2d. Cir. 2016). 
10 Brief, supra note *, at 36-39. The author of this Introductory Note was one of the lead co-authors of this brief, 
along with Zachary D. Clopton and Neil A.F. Popović. 
11 138 S.Ct. at 1869. The Court noted that “[t]he correct interpretation of Chinese law” was not before it and that it 
took no position on that question. Id. at 1875. 




What, then, does it mean to give “respectful consideration” to foreign government statements? 
The Supreme Court affirmed that “a federal court should carefully consider a foreign state’s 
views about the meaning of its own laws.”12 However, it emphasized that “the appropriate 
weight in each case will depend upon the circumstances,” and it explained that “[r]elevant 
considerations include the statement’s clarity, thoroughness, and support; its context and 
purpose; the transparency of the foreign legal system; the role and authority of the entity or 
official offering the statement; and the statement’s consistency with the foreign government’s 
past positions.”13 The Court also identified warning signs for courts to be alert to, noting that 
“[w]hen a foreign government makes conflicting statements…or…offers an account in the 
context of litigation, there may be cause for caution in evaluating the foreign government’s 
submission.”14 
 
Assessment and Implications 
 
The Supreme Court’s approach is a sensible one. Unlike the Second Circuit’s “bound to defer” 
rule, the “respectful consideration” standard does not prevent U.S. federal courts from 
“consider[ing] any relevant material or source” when determining foreign law, as Rule 44.1 
expressly authorizes them to do.15 Respectful consideration is also consistent with the principle 
of accuracy in the determination of foreign law, which implies that courts must consider 
information about foreign law based on how reliable and persuasive the information is,16 and 
with the principle that U.S. courts should determine law—including foreign law—
independently.17 
 
The “respectful consideration” standard is also consistent with the principal international treaties 
on the interpretation of foreign law:18 the European Convention on Information on Foreign 
Law19 and the Inter-American Convention on Proof of and Information on Foreign Law.20 Both 
treaties allow a court to request information about foreign law from a designated foreign 
government official. But even when there is a formal request and foreign government reply, the 
reply is not binding on the court.21 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court’s Animal Science opinion may 
be informative for the courts of other countries when ascertaining the content and meaning of 
foreign law. 
 
Although it rejected the Second Circuit’s bound-to-defer rule, the Supreme Court’s opinion does 
not imply that statements by foreign governments about foreign law are unimportant. To the 
 
12 Id. at 1873. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id.; Brief, supra note *, at 5-10. 
16 Id. at 11-16. 
17 Id. at 16-18. 
18 See 138 S.Ct. 1875; Brief, supra note *, at 23-25. 
19 European Convention on Information on Foreign Law, June 7, 1968, 720 U.N.T.S. 154. 
20 Inter-American Convention on Proof of and Information on Foreign Law, May 8, 1979, 1439 U.N.T.S. 111. 
21 See European Convention, art. 8 (“The information given in the reply shall not bind the judicial authority from 
which the request emanated.”); Inter-American Convention, art. 6 (“[Parties] shall not be required to apply the law, 
or cause it to be applied, in accordance with the content of the reply received.”). 
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contrary, one would expect that courts applying the respectful consideration standard will in 
many cases rely heavily a such statements.22 Ordinarily, for example, a U.S. court applying the 
respectful consideration standard would likely follow an independent foreign court’s 
authoritative interpretation of its own law in an unrelated case. Courts faced with issues of 
foreign law should welcome—and in some cases actively seek—information from a foreign state 
about its law.23 The contribution of the Animal Science decision is not to diminish the importance 
of foreign government statements about foreign law, but rather to clarify that a court is not 
required to treat those statements as conclusive and to provide factors to consider when 
determining how much weight to give to those statements. 
 
 
22 Cf. 138 S.Ct. at 1875 (referring favorably to principle that “a government’s expressed view of its own law is 
ordinarily entitled to substantial weight but not conclusive weight”). 
23 Brief, supra note *, at 37. 
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